The present article is an Indian perspective of India’s relations with its neighbors and other countries. Authors from the concerned countries are encouraged to send their articles on the same issue to be published in this journal.

Abstract

The study attempts to enquire into reasons leading to changes in India’s geopolitical code, from non-aligned approach to one of hegemonic and domination, not only at the regional level, but also at the global level. With the world becoming multi-polar, the non-aligned code of the Nehruvian legacy became redundant. India has emerged as one of the poles. Consistent threats and pressures from the smaller and larger neighbours have necessarily compelled India to re-shape her geopolitical code to one of ‘restraint’ hostility. And this, probably, made India an acknowledged power, from a regional power to a ‘weltmacht.’

Keywords: India, foreign policy, Foreign relations, Non-Aligned Movement, Geopolitical code, China, Pakistan, USA, USSR, Russia.

* E-mail: adhikari_sudeepto@rediffmail.com
Geopolitical code is defined as the operating code of a government’s foreign policy that evaluates places beyond its boundaries. ‘It is a set of strategic assumptions that a government makes about other states in forming its foreign policy. Such operational code(s) involves evaluation of places beyond the state’s boundaries in terms of its strategic importance and potential threats. It is not just state-centric; it also involves a particular single state’s view of the world. It operates at three levels: local, regional and global. The local-level code involves evaluation of neighbouring states……The regional-level code is required for states that aspire to project their power beyond their immediate neighbours. The governments of all regional powers and potential regional powers need to map out such code(s). Finally, a few states will have global policies, and their governments will have appropriate world-wide geopolitical codes’ (Taylor & Flint 2000 / 2004: 91). The geopolitical code gives a highly biased picture of the world on account of its being state-centric that carves out what Henrikson (1980) calls an ‘image-plan’. It is the building bloc of the geopolitical world orders.

The present paper is an attempt to analyze India’s ever changing strategic assumptions in the light of the following pertinent questions:

1. To what extent was India’s non-aligned geopolitical code a success during its formative stage?
2. Does India possess a hostile and aggressive approach toward its neighbours?
3. Does India aspire to become a regional power, or a global power?

**The Non-Aligned Geopolitical Code: Success or Failure**

India has a peculiar geographical location on the cross-road of the South Asia and the Central, or high Asia, and this has shaped its ‘image-plans’ to evaluate places beyond its boundaries, or in other words, it sets the strategic assumptions in forming its foreign policy.

The three spatial levels of approaches in Indian foreign policy can be identified during its formative stage, particularly, when Jawaharlal Nehru dominated Indian politics, and gave it a distinctive geopolitical code. At the local level, India offered a sort of informal protectorate over the small Himalayan kingdoms (Nepal, Bhutan, and Sikkim till Sikkim’s merger with India in 1975) and a paternal attitude to Sri Lanka, where it has interfered in the civil war. At the regional level, there was an acute rivalry with Pakistan...
in South Asia and with China at a larger Asian continental scale. Globally, India had desired, or pretended to become a world power. This was centered on Nehru’s status as a world statesman and his role in the establishment of the Non-Aligned Movement (Taylor & Flint 2000/2004).

India’s foreign policy was described as one of ‘neutrality’, ‘non-alignment’, or ‘independence’- a policy based on the consideration of each issue on its own merits.

In the first statement which he made when he became member for external Affairs in the Interim government in September, 1946, Nehru said: ‘In the sphere of foreign affairs, India will follow an independent policy, keeping away from power politics of groupings aligned against the other’. Krishna Menon, Nehru’s chief advisor on foreign policy, declared in the UN General Assembly, on October 17, 1960: ‘We are not neutral country……We want it understand that we do not welcome this appellation of being called a neutral, or neutralist, whatever it means…..We are neutral in regard to war or peace. We are not neutral in regard to domination by imperialist or other countries .We are not neutral with regard to ethical values…..Neutrality is a concept that arises only in war…..Therefore, our position is that we are unaligned and uncommitted nation in relation to the Cold War…..we do not belong to one camp or another’.

In his biography of Nehru, Michael Brecher (1959: 563) remarked: ‘The term to describe Indian foreign policy has undergone frequent changes. It has begun with ‘neutrality’, or ‘dynamic neutrality’, later became ‘neutralism’ and then ‘non-alignment’. Nehru prefers the phrase ‘positive policy for peace’.

Nehru placed particular emphasis on ‘non-alignment with the great power groups’, on opposition to colonialism, and on the necessity of peaceful co-existence and of creating a climate of peace. ‘Peace’, he argued, ‘can only be preserved by methods of peace. A war-like approach to peace is a contradiction in terms…..Peace cannot live in an atmosphere of constant preparation for war and threat of war….The major fact is that we are following not a passive or merely neutral policy, but a dynamic policy which is based on certain definite principles and objectives as well as certain methods. We try not to forget the means in search for our ends……It must be recognized……that any policy that is realistic must take into consideration the profound changes in the relationships of forces in Asia and the world’.

Initially, Nehru’s foreign policy developed along the idealistic lines,
combining a Gandhian moralist heritage and tradition with a social democratic idealism derived from contacts with British Labour leaders. In order to make the non-aligned geopolitical code successful, Nehru accepted Chinese suzerainty over Tibet through the infamous Sino-Indian Friendship Treaty in April 1954 that endorsed the ‘nebulous’ principles of peace, especially the Panch Shila, or Panchsheel (five principles of peace). It was probably the first attempt to make the non-aligned approach relevant to the contemporary ‘East versus West’, world geopolitical order, created on account of the ideological confrontation in a bi-polar world order. The 1954 Treaty, based on morality and ethics, was designed in a way as to resolve the differences over Tibet. Inherent in the Treaty was a ‘cautious’ declaration that the territorial disputes of the nature could be resolved peacefully by adopting the paradigm of the Panch Shila with the ultimate aim of generating a world of peaceful co-existence. India, then, launched a ‘moral’ propaganda offensive offering the five principles of peace (Panch Shila) as a solution to the world’s geopolitical problems. The non-aligned approach, as a matter of fact, was intended toward collective peace to challenge the emerging Cold War trend of collective security by military alliances. The success of the non-aligned geopolitical code was achieved in December 1957 when the United Nations endorsed the incorporation of the Panch Shila in its resolution, as a means to resolve the conflictual crisis, arising out of the ‘East versus West’, ideological confrontation between capitalism and socialism.

Parallel with the moral and ethical crusade to resolve the emerging international tension and crisis, India began the task of geopolitical engineering of bringing the ‘developing countries’ within the non-aligned fold so that these countries would not align themselves with either of the collective military alliances, taking shape. in 1947 (Asian Relations Conference) and then in 1949, when fifteen Asian countries met in New Delhi to protest against the colonial policy of the Netherlands in Southeast Asia, particularly, in Indonesia. For time, the non-aligned approach appeared successful at a relatively ‘larger’ regional level. In 1950, India convened the first ad hoc Afro-Asian ‘caucus’ at the United Nations.

At the local level, however, India offered a shadow protection to the Himalayan kingdoms: Nepal, Sikkim and Bhutan, without interfering in the internal politics of these kingdoms. It was a continuation of the British frontier policy, so at that level, the policy of non-intervention vis-à-vis non-alignment yielded some positive results.
But at the regional level, the non-aligned geopolitical code suffered at the Chinese hands. The Sino-Indian 1954-Treaty exposed the hollowness of the non-aligned approach, and a failure also. Tibet, which was independent till the British left the Sub-continent in 1947, fell to the Chinese aggression and subsequent occupation in 1950. Tibet had an independent history of several centuries, and the British policy was designed in a way to make its independence and territorial integrity inviolable. The British feared the Chinese design. India should have continued with the British Tibetan policy when it inherited the system as a result of the transfer of power in 1947. But, instead of protecting independence of Tibet, it allowed China to annex and occupy the territory of Tibet through military intervention, repudiating the obligation it had inherited from the British with regard to Tibet’s independence. India’s acquiescence to Chinese forceful and illegal occupation of Tibet, and subsequent acceptance of Tibet, being a ‘Region’ of China was in a sharp contrast to the New Delhi ‘conclave’ that was held in 1949 to protest against the Dutch colonial policy in Indonesia. Accepting Tibet as a ‘Region’ of China in the 1954-Treaty, India itself raised the question on the ‘validity’ of the boundary with China, particularly, the McMahon Line. With regard to its non-aligned approach to China, geopolitical code at the regional level, during its formative stage, was a failure, but in case of Sri-Lanka, at the local level, was one of intervention to re-install the government of Mr. Bandaranayke.

A meeting of twenty-nine countries of the Afro-Asian continental realm took place in 1955 at Bandung. This actually included a broad cross-section of countries of both the continents, including Communist China and North Vietnam, and pro-Western Japan and Philippines etc. In fact, it was attended by countries, belonging to both the mutually exclusive collective alliances. India and China were the key players at the Bandung conference. However, Pakistan did not attend it. The conference was a moral success no doubt, and was more of importance for symbolic reasons, but at the same time it lacked ‘pragmatism’, so far as the genuineness and relevance of the approach in the fast growing and changing international geopolitics was concerned.

Nevertheless, the first meeting of the Non-Aligned Movement took place at Belgrade in 1961, attended by twenty-six countries, but the countries in alliance with either super power were not invited. China, North Vietnam, Japan, and Philippines were eliminated, including Pakistan for their alleged membership to these military alliances and active participation in the operational processes of these alliances against each other.
India’s Changing Geopolitical Code: an Attempt at Analysis

The Non-Aligned Movement was the joint product of three great statesmen of the contemporary world: Nehru of India, Tito of Yugoslavia and Nasser of Egypt. The Suez crisis in 1956, resulting from the invasion of Egypt by Britain, France and Israel, all belonging to the NATO alliance, prompted India to support Egypt. It was a moral support, nothing more than that. Similarly India gave moral support to Tito, who was attempting to forge an independence from the Soviet Union in Eastern Europe. Hence, for both Egypt and Yugoslavia, their interest in a Non-Aligned movement was to find broad global support in their efforts to remain independent of the Cold War powers. India, on the other hand, had no such immediate threat and saw the movement as a vehicle for playing its role as a world power.…

The Non-Aligned Movement was actively involved in supporting anti-colonial revolutions and was vehemently against the Cold War assumption that all countries had to choose sides in the Great Contest (Taylor & Flint 2000 / 2004: 101). The territorial pattern, coming out of the movement, perhaps manifested a genuine precursor to a geopolitical transition to Galtung’s ‘World Classes’ world order (1975).

Galtung (1975) had proposed four alternative future geopolitical scenarios that appeared to transcend the Cold War. The first was the development of super-state rivalry based upon these ten units. In this scenario, there would be ten super-states in a perennial world of trading wars as each vied for economic advantage. In the second geopolitical scenario, each unit/super-state would try to protect its economy by promoting autarky. The end result of such a process would be the re-discovery of pan-regions as Northern super-states combine their Southern neighbours. Since there were only four Northern super-states, this could produce four pan-regions, which might or might not include India and China. In the third scenario, he put North against South (Japan, USA, European Union, Soviet Union against China, South East Asia, Latin America, Africa, Middle East, India). Galtung termed these states ‘world classes’. This was a ‘third-worldist’ view of the world politics, represented in the past by China’s or India’s claim to be the leader of the third world against the combined might of the USA and the Soviet Union. This type of thinking of geopolitical structuration was closely related to the social analyses from which world-systems analysis could be derived. There is no denying the fact that India held precedence over China in terms of ‘leading the third world countries vis-à-vis the mutually exclusive military alliances’
in the contemporary world. The Non-Aligned Movement was a success, because it caused revolt in the periphery against the colonial powers, leading to independence and de-colonization of the Afro-Asian nations, despite a few of them moving into the folds of the alliances. India’s uncommitted neutral approach, undoubtedly, held success at the global level because more and more states believed in the relevance of the movement that sought ‘balance of peace, rather than, balance of power’, in the world geopolitical order. Nevertheless, the movement did not cause what may be called ‘a geopolitical paradigm-shift’ in the contemporary scenario, because the destiny of the world was still in the hands of the alliances, facing each other in a belligerent way.

But, at the regional level, the neutral approach did not yield any significant success rather there was acute rivalry with China for the leadership of the newly-emerged third world countries of the Asian realm, and with Pakistan, the rivalry concentrated on a number of factors, such as communalism, refugee problems, water disputes and the Kashmir. In fact, both India and Pakistan inherited a conflictual relationship with hardened cleavages, and mutual exclusiveness, necessarily based on the ‘two-nation theory’. Both, India and Pakistan were born out of the same Indian nation, however, along the communal-religious pattern. Muslim areas in the north-west, and in the eastern Gangetic delta of the eastern region of the sub-continent were grouped and organized as independent Muslim nation-state of Pakistan (West and East Pakistan), of course, with a ‘divided’ geopolitical shape.

In spite of being born from the same Mother Indian Nation as twin-sisters, both India and Pakistan became enemy to each other, and the cleavage that developed as a result of religious mistrust, and extremism widened to the extent as to have caused geopolitical rivalry in the sub-continent. The non-aligned code was of no use at the regional level. And Pakistan renounced the Panch shila- the five principles of peace, as being ‘useless, and without any solid foundation of recognized, and approved standard international behaviour, rather, utopian, and philosophical lacking in realism’.

In the words of Rosenthal (1956): ‘Indeed a good part of India’s foreign policy is based on Pakistan’. Pakistan was at once India’s ‘first line of defense’ and the nearest neighbour, and at the same time the source or object of India’s deepest concerns in its regional geopolitical code. ‘In fact, in view of the past relationships of the people who now inhabit the two
countries and in view of their inescapable intimacy, the relations between India and Pakistan might well be treated as aspects of domestic rather than of foreign policies’ (Palmer 1961: 245).

In their attitudes towards each other India and Pakistan were greatly handicapped by a communal past, the tragedy of partition, and a long series of issues which sustained friction between them since independence. But, the most important being the question of the accession of Jammu & Kashmir to the Indian Union on October 26, 1947. Pakistan disapproved the accession of the State to India. India and Pakistan nearly became involved in a war over the territory in 1948. Since January 1, 1949, a cease-fire has prevailed. Jammu & Kashmir has been in fact divided along the cease-fire line. Jammu & Kashmir got divided with a bulk of the northern and mountainous Kashmir, including Gilgit went under Pakistan’s control. Roughly, 83,100 square kilometers (one-third of the total area) of Jammu & Kashmir went under Pakistan’s control. Pakistan has never accepted Kashmir’s accession with India, rather, it called for a plebiscite to ascertain peoples’ view whether they political conditions in South Asia. On the other hand, India had the communist bloc on her long northern frontiers, along the Himalayan and Trans-Himalayan mountains. Relations with China, particularly, with regards to the boundary and / or frontier had never been cordial since the late nineteenth century, particularly since the disappearance of the Russian threats in the Ladakh, following the Anglo-Russian Convention in 1897, when China attempted to push forward its southern boundaries beyond the centuries-old customary-traditional line, along the Himalayan and the Trans-Himalayan mountains. Sino-Indian boundary relations were historically disputed. And, right from the beginning, even during the British period, China was considered to be India’s ‘enemy’ number one, because it had attempted to tamper with the long-settled traditional and customary boundary line along the high crest-cum-watershed of the Himalayas, and the Trans-Himalayas.

Therefore, the failure of the non-aligned approach vis-à-vis Panch shila in terms of the Sino-Indian border relations in the 50s and early 60s of the last century was not surprising, rather, it was a century-old geopolitical reality that simply revived, when both, India and China became free of foreign control. So long as the British governed India, China preferred a cautious acquiescence, but once the British left, the dragon became active to cause troubles to India, staking claims over Ladakh, and NEFA (presently
the Arunachal Pradesh of the Union of India). India’s acquiescence on China’s military activism in Tibet in the early 50s of the last century, and its subsequent occupation, and incorporation in Chinese politico-administrative system, and India’s agreeing to accept Tibet as a political region of China in the Sino-Indian Friendship Treaty, signed on April 29, 1954, simply manifested an inherent weakness in the non-aligned geopolitical code. India could not oppose Chinese military action in Tibet. Tibet was independent till its occupation by the Chinese forces. Succumbing to Chinese pressure on Tibet issue was a serious strategic blunder that India committed, placing the entire Himalayan boundary vulnerable to Chinese aggression and invasion. Was it not a reflection of weakness at the regional level of the paradigm of the non-aligned geopolitical code that India felt proud of carrying forward in international arena?

Chinese pressure and outward expansion continued beyond the crest-cum-watershed of the Himalayas and the Trans-Himalayas until it occupied forward posts in Ladakh, and in NEFA, particularly, in the Twang area, and it went on till it invaded India in 1962. India lost thousands of square-kilometers of area in the Ladakh region in the north-western frontier, and in the Arunachal Pradesh, in the north-eastern frontier, China claimed over more than 40 thousand square-kilometers of area. There is no recognized boundary between India and China, it is just ‘a line of actual control’, particularly since the Chinese aggression in 1962. India’s failure to contain the Sino-Pakistani Border Agreement on March 02, 1963, involving a part of Northern Kashmir was, yet another example of failure at the regional level of the non-aligned approach. In 1968, China successfully detonated a nuclear device, despite a strong world-wide protest. China, thus, joined the USA, USSR, UK, and France as a nuclear power State. China had already separated herself from the Soviet-led continental Eurasian power bloc. Faced with hostile US-led military alliance on the one hand and ‘enemy’ Soviet Union on the other hand, perhaps compelled China to go for nuclear deterrence against them, but for India, it was a potential source of concern. China had already occupied bulk of the Ladakhee territory, and threatened mobilization across the McMahon Line. With China becoming a nuclear power, the relevance of the non-aligned geopolitical code was put to test that needed a more pragmatic geopolitical code which could rival China’s approach.

Although, the non-aligned geopolitical code was a necessity for India, on account of its political location on the threshold of the non-communist
capitalist maritime power blocs and the communist continental power bloc of the Eurasian realm, with each putting its pressure to bring India into their military and political folds, but India preferred a middle-path, i.e., an uncommitted approach towards each other. To look at the Cohen’s model (1973) South Asia was conceived of as ‘an independent, rather small geopolitical region, hemmed in between the Trade-Dependent Maritime World, dominated by the traditional maritime powers, literally by the United States of America, and the Eurasian Continental World, dominated by the USSR and China on the one hand, and in between two ‘shatter-belts: Middle East and South-East Asia, these are characterized by lack of political unity, political fragmentation, but are caught in between the contrasting interests of the two major geopolitical regions.’

Was this independent characteristic of South Asian geopolitical region (minus Pakistan) geographically destined, or politically destined? Was the non-aligned geopolitical code that India put into its image-plan with regard to its foreign policy, a mere reflection of this geopolitical pattern that Cohen (1973) visualized? May be in terms of consistent pressure from mutually exclusive emerging political realities and patterns since the end of the Second World War that India preferred such geopolitical code which was more or less a geopolitical necessity during the formative phase of its federation, but it was definitely a failure at the regional level, because India and Pakistan, in spite of being born from the same Mother Nation, continued rivalry to the extent of outbreak of wars, and China, despite being subject to foreign rule and exploitation like India, adopted a belligerent attitude toward India to the level as to have invaded India. China has consistently renounced India’s Panch shila paradigm to resolve the centuries-old border disputes.

To, Pakistan, the Panch shila paradigm in the field of international relations that India attempted to put forward and/or carry forward to resolve political crises in the post-war world, lacked pragmatism, and could not be the basis of resolving territorial conflicts, and disputes. Instead of peaceful resolution to the conflicts, and disputes, Pakistan all the time favoured ‘hostile’ solution through military activism, to resolve the Kashmir conflict. It was the period of ‘containment and (nuclear) deterrence: the US world model, and Pakistan got itself fitted in that model against India, though the model was designed to counter-balance USSR’s basic strategic advantage on account of its ‘superior’ geopolitical position, beside a strong military prowess. Pakistan had no threats from the USSR, so, there was no
need for Pakistan to get into the US model of world: containment and (nuclear) deterrence, but its objective was to keep India under pressure, and constantly engaged.

Pakistan had always maintained a kind of ‘diplomatic’ superiority over India, in the sense that in spite of being an active member of the CENTO, and SEATO, which were designed against the continental communist power bloc, Pakistan succeeded in befriending China against India-an unholy alliance, but for that Pakistan was not reprimanded by the United States. Similarly, Chinese strategic friendship with Pakistan -a strategic partner of the USA, against India spoke of ‘entrapped geopolitics’ on the threshold of High Asia and South Asia, in which India was at the receiving end. The political complexities, arising out of the ‘emergent axis’ against India, at the regional level appeared to have made the non-aligned geopolitical code, rather, redundant.

The geopolitical pattern that emerged on account of growing Sino-Pakistani alliance against India somehow resembled to what Spykman (1944) wrote: ‘…..there has never really been a simple land power-sea power opposition. The historical alignment has always been in terms of some members of the rimland………against some members of the rimland…….’. Pakistan being a part of the Asiatic rimland, however, got aligned with China-an emergent land power of the contemporary world, with nuclear capability against India, a member of the same Asiatic rimland, to which Pakistan belonged.

In September1965 Pakistan with Chinese support again dared to engineer a massive infiltration into Kashmir across the 1949 cease-fire line with the object of changing the alignment, and to cause complete collapse of the rule of law in the state to the extent as to liberate the ‘remaining’ territory of Jammu & Kashmir. The infiltration was promptly followed by the Pakistani invasion, and war broke between India and Pakistan along the cease-fire line, and the Indian army, while driving out the infiltrators, and the Pakistani armed units beyond the cease-fire line, and the Indians succeeded to occupy two Pakistani outposts near Kargil, thus securing the vital route to the Ladakh-Chinese border and preventing any Sino-Pakistani link-up near Karakorum Pass. China had been consistently favouring Pakistan’s support for ‘Kashmir people’s struggle for freedom and the right of national self-determination,’ in spite of the fact that the Kashmiri had already approved of the accession to India which was ratified by the State Assembly. China issued an ultimatum warning India to stop the war, or to
face the consequences. Chinese forces became ‘active’ along the ‘actual line of control’, in the Ladakh, and in the NEFA region. This was aimed at pressuring India to stop engaging the Pakistani forces in the Pak-occupied Kashmir. China accused India of intrusions over the border, especially at Nathu La. Chinese invasion loomed large over India, however, the Chinese threats receded in the face of the growing world-wide reaction to their ultimatum.

The USA, and the UK had extended their moral support to Pakistan, and made a ‘covert’ diplomatic attack on India, so that India could stop fighting in the Pak-occupied part of Kashmir. Break-up in the Eurasian continental power bloc, with China getting out of it, accusing the USSR deviating from the true Marxian ideology, had its impact on the geopolitics of South Asia, in the sense that the USSR came out openly in favour of India’s stand on the Kashmir conflict, because it no other option

To quote Woodman (1969: 312): ‘The US government made it very clear that if China took advantage of the Indo-Pakistan war, Mao Tse-tung could expect retaliation. The Soviet Union faced a complex dilemma: if Moscow joined with Washington in trying to end the war, China, as well as Afro-Asian communists would condemn her as betraying communism; if she took no action, then the USA would extend her influence in the Indian sub-continent; if her weight were thrown on India’s side, Pakistan might become a satellite of China.’

Given the emerging geopolitical trend following Chinese ultimatum, warning India of consequences if it continued with ‘military build-ups’ along the Sino-Sikkimese boundary (?), and growing Chinese influence in the politics of the sub-continent, compelled the USSR to side and / to favour India, but it was not without intention, rather, what they wanted was to bring India into their strategic fold, against both USA and China, so that they could secure a strong foot-hold on the sub-continent. The USSR pledged support to India’s non-aligned geopolitical code. The September 1965 India-Pakistan war continued for 17-day, however, without any sincere attempt on the part of the world community to end the war, though the Security Council of the UNO called for cease-fire. Chinese intervention had demonstrated to the world her extraordinary combination of strategic withdrawal and propaganda bravado. The United Nations emerged as an effective arbitrator and the Soviet succeeded in the unaccustomed role of a mediator by bringing Pakistan and India to the conference table at Tashkent
on January 10, 1966. The basis of the Tashkent agreement was the paradigm of Panchshila. But, the spirit of Tashkent soon evaporated, and the optimism proved short-lived.

The construction of the Karakorum highway across the Pak-occupied Kashmir in 1967, linking Chinese Xingjian (Sinkiang) Province with the Pakistani Province Sind-vis-à-vis the Karachi Port proved to be great strategic disadvantage for India. Sino-Pakistani military build-up and cooperation grew stronger and stronger. And this military build-up, as a part of the Sino-Pakistani strategic partnership was neither aimed at the US strategic model nor against the USSR, rather, it was aimed at India, and against India’s practicing non-aligned approach. The balance of power was always in Pakistan’s favour, ever since Pakistan became an active member of the US world model, beside being a Chinese strategic ally against India. Being a strong admirer, and believer in the paradigm of Panchshila vis-à-vis non-aligned geopolitical code, India had always renounced the concept of balance of power on the ground that it caused arms race in the region, and might lead to war.

However, it was quite pertinent to see the US acquiescence on Pakistan’s growing strategic partnership with their arch rival, China, against India. Was the US acquiescence, a part of their grand geopolitical strategy to see India strategically weakened to the extent as to come to terms with Pakistan on the Kashmir conflict?

In view of this complicated geopolitical scenario in the South Asia-vis-à-vis the world, India’s geopolitical stand in its non-aligned approach, was not in keeping with the realities, rather, contradictory to her interests. A slight change in her non-aligned approach seemed to be a political necessity as she had to ‘confront’ with Pakistan, China and the USA on her soil. The USSR also required a South Asiatic ‘rimland’ strategic partner to contain growing threat from the USA, and sought to neutralize Chinese growing presence in the region. There was something common in the interests of both, continental Russia, and maritime, rather, ‘rimland’ India that the two joined hands to give a new outlook to their bilateral relations, by agreeing to forge a ‘strategic relation and defense pact’, to sustain their defense requirements, and to protect their strategic vulnerability.

It was in September 1971, India and Soviet Union signed the first ‘defense agreement’, known as the Indo-Soviet Treaty of Friendship and Co-Operation for twenty years. It was a departure from the Nehruvian geopolitical code. Had Nehru been alived, he would not have allowed the
Indo-Soviet strategic Treaty, and at the same time, would not have favoured the disintegration of Pakistan vis-a-vis the creation of Bangladesh. He was conscious of his international stature as an ‘apostle’ of peace. Contemporary historians and politicians held him responsible for all kinds of disputes with the neighbours. Even to-day people have the same view that whatever problems India has with Pakistan and China, are the results of Nehru’s mishandling of the situations.

With the signing of the treaty, the regional balance of power that used to be in Pakistan’s favour, somehow changed. It gave rise to a new strategic dynamism in the sub-continent, however, in the form of arms race. India was required to be a little bit hostile toward Pakistan, given the fast changing political scenario in East Pakistan following the army crack-down on the innocent Bengalis, which had caused massive refugee problem in India. The war of independence began in East Pakistan. India supported the freedom struggle in East Pakistan in violation of one of the five principles of peace, because a ‘dismembered’ Pakistan was always in her strategic advantage in the subcontinent.

Abandoning the paradigm of Panch shila, India became active to make East Pakistan an independent State, and this was made possible because of the Indo-Soviet defense treaty.

The 1971 war with Pakistan was decisive for India for so many reasons: an independent Bangladesh came into being in place of East Pakistan, and the new nation was quickly recognized by the world community; the US warship, Enterprise that moved across the Bay of Bengal with the object of helping Pakistan in the war, particularly to see that Pakistan retained its sovereignty in East Pakistan, had to return back without helping Pakistan for fear of being attacked by the Soviet warships, present in the region; Chinese role was, rather, ambiguous this time, probably because of the threats of the Soviet intervention. India’s position became pre-eminently strong after the war. In fact the war ended with the entire Pakistani army, numbering nearly one lakh, in East Pakistan and / or Bangladesh, surrendering before the Indian army as prisoner of war (PWO). This time again Pakistan attempted to ‘distort’ the 1949 cease-fire line in Jammu & Kashmir, during the war, but could not succeed, rather, a substantial part of the Pak-occupied Kashmir came under Indian control, because the Indian army had moved beyond the cease-fire line, while driving out the invaders.

The 14-day war came to an end following a unilateral cease-fire on the
western front, declared by India, that went in effect on December 17, 1971, at 20.00 hrs. However, the war on the eastern front came to an end following the surrender of the Pakistani army on December 16, 1971. It was a good opportunity for India to settle the Kashmir problem for ever, because Pakistan having been defeated in the war, was at a receiving end, and there was a public demand in Pakistan for immediate release of the Pakistani POW, lodged in different Indian jails, even at the cost of Kashmir. India could have used this Pakistani sentiment that POW would be repatriated only when Pakistan accepted Jammu & Kashmir’s accession to India, and vacated the ‘occupied’ territory. But, instead of discussing this issue, India negotiated on the cease-fire line only, with the object of making it an international boundary between India and Pakistan across Jammu & Kashmir- accepting the status quo with regard to the division of the territory. The secret negotiations, somehow, became public and there was strong protest in the country over the ‘negotiated’ arrangement on the cease-fire line. India’s stand seemed to be ambiguous, rather, conflicting- a kind of ‘blend of Nehruvian geopolitical code and real politics,’- emotion got clubbed together with reality. And, this ambiguous stand of India, greatly benefited Pakistan.

On July 02, 1972, India and Pakistan signed the Simla Agreement. Both the sides agreed to withdraw their troops to the line before the out-break of the war on December 03, 1971, and to obtain and to identify it, it was resolved to give responsibility to the army commanders to prepare 25 maps to delineate 740 kilometers of long boundary line. It was further resolved to, however, on India’s insistence that a new line of control, the line on which the fighting ceased on December 17, 1971, be accepted as the new cease-fire line, which would be henceforth known as the ‘line of control’ (LOC), instead of the cease-fire line. It was further resolved that ‘both sides would respect the position of either side without prejudice to the recognized position, beside easy repatriation of the POW.’ In the Simla agreement one finds reflections of the Panch shila again.

The contents of the Simla Agreement revealed that India considered Jammu & Kashmir as a disputed territory, and that needed a peaceful resolution to the conflict. But the agreement appeared to have made the whole exercise of accession of Jammu & Kashmir to India doubtful. India should have pressurized Pakistan to recognize and accept the accession as final, before finalizing the terms and conditions for the agreement. It could have also pressurized Pakistan for vacating the occupied part. Pakistan
would have agreed, given the public opinion there, at the time, that (Pakistani citizens) they were interested not in Kashmir, but in the release of the Pakistani POW. But nothing that sort happened. The Simla agreement was a diplomatic victory for Pakistan, and a failure for India’s foreign policy.

**Hostile and Aggressive Approach: Departure from Nehruvian Peace Ideals?**

India is almost surrounded by a number of neighbours, with whom her relations are not very cordial, rather, relations with China and Pakistan have never been smooth. China has consistently attempted to alter the line of actual control since the cessation of the war in 1962, in both, the western sector and the eastern sector. China is a constant threat to India, and perhaps the enemy number one. Pakistan, ever since its dismemberment in December 1971, has been actively causing trouble to India in various ways. Moreover, the Sino-Pakistani strategic alliance against India for long has been a matter of serious concern, so far as the territorial integrity of the country is concerned. China is a nuclear power, but it holds under its occupation a substantial part of Ladakh since early 50s, similarly, a substantial part (almost one-third part) of Jammu & Kashmir is under illegal occupation of Pakistan since October 1947. Pakistan a very small country, compared to India’s territorial size, but it often, however, together with China, threatens India. China is relatively powerful than India, and together with Pakistan, the power potentials of the two become huge to decide the destiny of the subcontinent (?)

It is in the background of the emerging geopolitical scenario as a result of growing Sino-Pakistani strategic and political alliance against India, there was a need to abandon the non-aligned approach, particularly at the regional level, and to replace it by a ‘restraint’ hostile and aggressive approach, particularly, towards China and Pakistan, if India were to survive. India, which had earlier renounced the balance of power theory in local, regional and international geopolitics as being ‘sustainer’ to arms race vis-à-vis rivalries, now realized its relevance in practical and real politics. The lose it suffered at the hands of Pakistan and China can only be compensated if it started its military build-up to the extent as to equal Pakistan and China, particularly, in terms of power potentials, so that a perfect balance of power could exist in the subcontinent. A new arms race set in, with Pakistan started
acquiring arm and ammunitions from the USA and China, and from other NATO countries, India depending on the Soviet Union, for its arms requirements. The whole subcontinent came under the influence of the Cold War vis-à-vis the super confrontation.

The ‘satellite’ geopolitics, i.e. super power rivalries for the control of the sky began to push the world towards a nuclear holocaust (Bunge, 1982). Despite the UN resolution of making the Indian Ocean, a zone of peace, it turned into an arena of intense super-power rivalries. The USA, which had purchased the Diego Garcia Islands in the Indian Ocean from the UK, started converting the island into a sophisticated military base, as a part of its nuclear deterrence strategic policy against the Soviet Union, despite strong protest from India and other littoral countries. It was in the midst of such intense geopolitical rivalries at the global level, with its impact in the subcontinent, and consistent Sino-Pakistani pressure, India detonated its first nuclear explosion in 1974 in Pokhran in Rajasthan. The detonation of a nuclear explosion marked the beginning of departure from the Nehruvian peace model to a more realistic, pragmatic ‘aggressive’ model, particularly at the regional level. Soon after India’s detonation of a nuclear explosion, Pakistan with the Chinese help successfully detonated a nuclear explosion. Thus, a nuclear arms race began in the subcontinent. All these three neighbouring countries of the South Asia and High Asia: India, Pakistan and China with common boundaries, became nuclear powers, while the latter two were in an alliance against the former, and the balance went against India, again. But, India had a reason to be less concerned in that situation, because of the 1971 Indo-Soviet Treaty that guaranteed safety and security to her in case of any potential military threats. The treaty was signed for twenty years, and it was due to expire in 1991. Naturally, there was no fear for India. India succeeded in preventing a regional alliance between her neighbours, against her, particularly, when Pakistan, under Chinese influence, sought for their cooperation and collaboration for a kind of an alliance to stop India’s growing military strength.

Neighbours, like, Myanmar (former Burma), Bangladesh, Sri-Lanka, and the Himalayan kingdoms, Nepal, Sikkim, and Bhutan renounced to be drawn into the grand alliance that Pakistan proposed under Chinese influence, against India. Rather, Sikkim merged with India in 1975. China protested strongly against the merger, but of no use, because the merger was done through a referendum, and the Sikkimese overwhelmingly supported it. This time, China did not issue any ultimatum, warning India of severe
consequences if it went ahead with the merger process. The Chinese reaction to the merger of Sikkim to India, merely confined to her verbal protest nothing more than that. Chinese attitude, therefore, revealed the fact that China realized India’s growing military strength.

The merger of Sikkim, perhaps, marked the beginning of the success of India’s re-defined / re-shaped geopolitical code that manifested a departure from the traditional Nehruvian approach, to a more realistic approach.

Indian army played a big role in the Island States of the Maldives, and Mauritius. Similarly, it intervened in the civil war in Sri-Lanka, where it army went to establish peace. India had stopped the entry of Pakistani soldiers, when the Sri-Lankan authority had sought for their help to suppress the Tamil rebellions. Although, India had adopted a policy of ‘restraint’ hostility in its geopolitical code, but it never went for an ‘aggrandizement’ foreign policy. India’s re-defined foreign policy was designed towards maintaining her territorial integrity which had suffered most during the formative phase of its federation, when her territories were forcefully occupied by China and Pakistan. India had also warned Bangladesh when its border security forces made attempts to cross over the Bengal border. At one stage, Indian army had to move into Bangladesh to stop unprovoked firing by the Bangladesh Rifles over the Indian citizens. She had asked the Myanmar military junta to install democracy, and to release the pro-democracy leader who has been detained for long. Indian army had also moved into the Bhutanese territory to flush out the insurgent outfits, which had their camps, meant for anti-India operation.

With the shift of the global geopolitics from the Indian Ocean to the Pacific Ocean, following the end of the super-power rivalry, and Cold War, India’s responsibility to police the Indian Ocean, particularly, the Bay of Bengal region has increased. It is in this region of the Indian Ocean has increased the Chinese military (naval) pressure due to Myanmar’s pro-Chinese policy. Chinese military (naval) presence has also been felt in the territorial waters of Pakistan. In view of this changing geopolitics in the Indian Ocean, India’s role has become a necessity for her own security. Littoral countries, including South Africa and Australia also favour India’s role to police the oceanic region.

India’s ‘restraint’ hostility approach, particularly, towards her neighbours has also been conditioned the following pertinent factors:

a) to take pre-emptive steps to foil any attempts by any of the neighbours
to forceful occupation of territory, and to neutralize threats to the integrity of the Nation;
b) to stop cross-border movements of insurgents, particularly in the northeastern region, form Myanmar, Bangladesh, China, also from Nepal;
c) to stop cross-border terrorism along the line of control in Jammu & Kashmir.

Pakistan, China, Bangladesh, Myanmar, and to an extent Nepal have been sustaining several insurgent groups of Assam, Nagaland, Manipur, Mizoram, Tripura, and Pak-Occupied Kashmir, which are fighting against Indian Government for independence of their territories. These neighbouring countries are providing all kinds of help to these insurgent groups with the object of territorializing secessionism in the border areas to the extent as to cause disintegration of India.

Could the Nehruvian geopolitical code be viable to contain the cross-border insurgency, and cross-border terrorism, being sustained by the neighbours?

Since 1980, Pakistan has been sustaining terrorism in India. First, it disturbed the Punjab state of India for almost ten years. It provided all kinds of logistic support to the Sikh terrorists. The purpose was to create an independent Khalistan in place of the Punjab. Several thousands innocent lives in the state, were lost. The Government of India had to go for military intervention, code-named ‘Operation Blue-Star’, in June 1984, to flush out the terrorists holed-up in the Golden Temple. Although, the operation was successful, but the end-result was quite painful because of the assassination of the Indian Prime Minister, Mrs. Indira Gandhi- the architect of the ‘hostile’ geopolitical code. The Khalistan movement, however, weakened over time, and finally disappeared. But, India-Pakistan relationships worsened very much.

Failure to gain success in Khalistan movement, Pakistan now turned to Kashmir again, with a new objective. Soviet intervention in Afghanistan had rendered several thousands Afghans homeless, and these homeless Afghans entered Pakistan as refugees. Pakistan settled them in the Occupied-Kashmir, with some ulterior motive. These homeless Afghans had fought the Russians in Afghanistan, and, thus, they had acquired sufficient knowledge of mountain warfare. Moreover, they belonged to the same racial stock, to which the inhabitants of Gilgit (part of Pak-Occupied Kashmir) belonged, i. e. the Poshtu people. With the help of these homeless Poshtu
Afghans, Pakistan formed several militant organizations, with arm-training camps, spread across the Occupied Kashmir, particularly, close to the line of control, with the object of disturbing the rule of law, and creating terror in Jammu & Kashmir. In the 80s, Pakistan made attempts to take over the strategic Siachen Glacier, but the attempts were foiled by the Indian army. Having failed to capture the strategic Siachen Glacier, Pakistan began sustaining terrorism in Jammu & Kashmir with the help of the militant organizations that it formed.

Since 1989 Pakistan started abetting cross-border terrorism to disturb the state of Jammu & Kashmir. Over time the intensity of Pakistan-sponsored cross-border terrorism increased to the extent as to have created a ‘war-like’ situation, all along the line of control in Jammu & Kashmir. An Israeli-type military action to destroy the militant camps beyond line of control in the Occupied Kashmir was hotly debated in the political circle, but the plan was dropped and abandoned for reasons best known to the ruling elites. Instead, India detonated a series of nuclear explosions to ‘terrorize’ Pakistan in 1998, but the attempts misfired with Pakistan responding to India’s challenge, detonated a series of nuclear explosions. A nuclear arm-race between India and Pakistan, thus, started taking shape over Kashmir that made the ‘geopolitics’ in the sub-continent highly sensitive and nuclearized. Pakistan described cross-border terrorism as ‘freedom struggle,’ and re-newed the demand for ‘plebiscite’ in Jammu & Kashmir. But, this time, Pakistan’s demand did not get support from the western world, but China continued to support it. India was required to be tough this time. With the increase in the intensity of cross-border terrorism, the political situation in the state of Jammu & Kashmir became more ‘fluid and threatening’. Villages after villages, inhabited by the Muslims, Hindus, and the Sikhs, were targeted by the Pak-trained terrorists which saw brutal killings of innocents people.

Pakistan, as it is said, had vowed to avenge the loss of East Pakistan in 1971 war, by dislodging Jammu & Kashmir from the India Union. It was, perhaps, in the background of a specified political strategy Pakistan used the Afghan refugees to obtain its desired political goal. By settling the Afghan refugees in the occupied part of Kashmir, Pakistan sought to change the demographic character of the region, so that in future, this region could give more trouble to India geo-strategically. As a part of a ‘war-game’ Pakistan secretly planned a massive infiltration across the line of control into the Kashmir valley in 1999-2000, with the help of the Afghan refugees, local
tribal terrorists, Talibani elements, and so on. The plan of infiltration was to be executed in the summer of 2001, particularly, when the ice starts making it easier to cross the mountains and deep valleys vis-à-vis the line of control. Massive infiltration occurred in the summer of 2001. It was the largest infiltration since 1947. The infiltrators had occupied the bankers that the Indian troops had temporarily vacated. This is the normal practice of the Indian troops to vacate the bankers in the summer months and to re-occupy them with the beginning of the cool months, because the pressure from the other side becomes less during these summer months. The Pakistan-supported infiltrators used this opportunity, they not only occupied and infiltrated into Indian territory, but also brought a sophisticated weaponry system and huge ration and food items with the intention of long warfare.

Fierce fighting continued for nearly month between the Indian army, and the infiltrators and the Pakistani army combined. But the fighting was confined along the line of control. The fighting was known as the Kargil war. The Indian army had planned to cross the line of control, but the decision was, latter abandoned because, as thought, then, by the strategists that Pakistan might use her nuclear weapons. Although the infiltrators and the elements of the Pakistani army which had occupied the bankers within Indian territory, were driven out. After much persuasion by the US, and the members of G7, Pakistan agreed to respect the line of control. China, however, maintained a ‘cautious’ neutrality during the Kargil war, in spite of the visit of the Pakistani foreign minister to master Peking’s support, but he had to return empty-handed. The change in Chinese attitude might be attributed to: (1) India’s growing strength in the region, and (2) apprehension of troubles in Tibet, because the Tibetans had been demanding freedom from the Chinese rule for long, and China feared that a support to Pakistan’s Kashmir policy might result in a demand for right to self-determination for the Tibetans vis-a-vis a demand for independence of Tibet.

Pakistan, however, became diplomatically isolated during the Kargil war. But, lose in the Kargil war, made Pakistan to further intensify the cross-border terrorism not only in Jammu & Kashmir, but also elsewhere in India. The attack on Indian Parliament in December 2001 was a part of the cross-border terrorism, and war again seemed inevitable between India and Pakistan. There was every apprehension of escalation of a nuclear war between the two, but somehow the war was averted. India, however, continued to adopt an hostile attitude towards Pakistan, and in a changed world political scenario, following the cessation of the Cold War, the
relevance of a non-aligned geopolitical code disappeared, and, at the same, time a more vigorous foreign policy, not based on the emotion of the Panch shila, became a geopolitical necessity for India. Nevertheless, India tried to improve bi-lateral relations with Pakistan. At the various meetings and summits of the South Asian Association of Regional Cooperation (SAARC) India had adopted a very positive attitude towards Pakistan, but Pakistan was, rather, reluctant to normalize relation with India. It was only at the Islamabad Summit of the SAARC that a change in Pakistan attitude was noticed. And, since then both the countries started what may be called ‘confidence building measures,’ but the outcomes are yet to be encouraging. Pakistan’s continued support to terrorism in Jammu & Kashmir, and in other parts of India raised doubts over her intention. Therefore, a ‘hostile’ attitude towards Pakistan is allowed to be carried on till Pakistan openly abandons her hostility against India.

Apart from Pakistan, India faced troubles from her eastern and northern neighbours, because these neighbours prefer to see India, rather, weak, so that it could not dominate the South Asia. India was required to be cautious from Sri-Lanka, although the civil war there in Sri-Lanka, had India’s implicit but tactical support, once, because one of the involved communities in the civil war has paternal linkages with the Indian Tamils, therefore, clandestine support to the fighting Tamils was a socio-cultural paternal necessity for Indian government. But, now situations changed, following the assassination of Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi by the Tamil militants. Instead of being hostile to the Sinhalese, and the Sri-Lankan government, the Indian government has expressed serious concern to the militancy of the Tamils. A support to the Tamil militancy in Sri-Lanka will create a ‘natural’ problem for Indian state of Tamilnad. Therefore, it is in the interest of India’s territorial integrity that India should have a hostile approach towards the Sri-Lankan Tamils, so that these elements could not create problems in the Indian state of Tamilnadu. India needs some kind of ‘restraint’ hostile approach towards Nepal, because it has become a potential source of ‘red’ terrorism, may be under the influence of China. Nepal is taking the opportunity of open borders with India, and ‘exporting’ red elements to India in an organized way, with the object of causing political instability in the frontier and northern peripheral areas of India. Large part of India is now under the influence of the red terror, being sustained by the communists of Nepal. Sino-Nepalese relations have improved to a greater extent that
necessarily worries to India. The Nepalese communists are getting supports from their Chinese counterparts to cause troubles in India. Since the Indo-Nepalese boundary is not restricted one, the cross-border movement is very easy. Besides, so many problems have emerged between India and Nepal that require a tough attitude towards Nepal.

It is a hard fact reality that emerging geopolitical scenario in and around India, and the Indian ocean as well, necessarily make India to pursue a tough and ‘restraint’ hostile geopolitical code, rather than a peaceful Panch shila geopolitical code, towards her neighbours, because of their consistent supports to the insurgent and terrorist groups of the various ethnic and sub-nationalist groups of India, which have waged war against India, using the territories of these neighbours.

Similarly, Australia and the Republic of South Africa also do not prefer to India’s policing of the Indian Ocean. India, particularly, since the Kargil war, has entered into strategic deals with a number of countries of Central Asia, and with the Island Countries of the Arabian Sea. This shows a ‘paradigm-shift’ in India’s geopolitical code from Panch shila to one of hegemony and domination, beyond Cohen-stated (1972) South Asian geo-strategic region. India is looking towards both the Pacific Ocean and the Atlantic Ocean, as she is making efforts to ensure her presence in both the oceans, not just for strategic purposes, but also for political, social and economic purposes.

India’s main approach is to frustrate any move by her immediate neighbours to form a strategic ‘alliance’ against her, and for that an aggressive geopolitical code cannot be ruled out, rather, it is the best way to maintain regional balance of power.

The proposed Indo-US nuclear deal is very much a part of a ‘paradigm-shift’ in India’s geopolitical code, given the geopolitical developments, rapidly taking place in the post Cold War world, with China making every possible effort to downsize India’s strategic, political, economic, and other interests, not only in Asia-Pacific, and Asia-Indian Ocean realms, but also in South America-Atlantic Ocean-African realm, so that India could not equal China in international geopolitics.
Regional or Global Power

Successful detonations of a series of nuclear explosions and test-fires of inter-continental missiles of wider ranges have made India, one of the emerging global powers to play a decisive role in international geopolitics. India is an emerging economy also, with a relatively higher growth rate. Though, economic growth is not higher than Japan and China, but it is certainly higher to sustain her military prowess vis-à-vis nuclear capabilities for the years to come.

The Soviet Union relegated to a peripheral country after the cessation of the Cold War vis-à-vis the end of confrontation, because its economy was incapable to sustain her military prowess. Pakistan may have acquired nuclear capability, but its economic capacity is not such that it can sustain its nuclear programmes vis-à-vis military prowess for long. It is a falling economy with a stagnant negative growth for the last couple of years, and there is no sign of its improvement in the coming future. It may face the same fate as the Soviets had experienced in the late 90s of the last century.

India emerged as a South Asian regional power in the early 90s, particularly, when her economy started coming out of recession, following the adoption of the economic privatization and liberalization policy, allowing foreign investments, in the economic sector, including in the sector of infrastructure. Towards the end of the 20th. Century, India was recognized as a ‘fast developing’ country by the western political and strategic analysts, and, then, by the USA and its allies. But, China’s reaction in this regard was more ‘guarded’. It was during this time, India made a series of successful detonations of nuclear explosions, besides successes in the field of defense researches, but these ‘successes,’ probably, worried western powers, particularly, the USA, that put ‘sanction’ against India. Several western countries, including other countries holding nuclear capabilities, known for their power potentials also followed the US way. India was asked to sign the Nuclear Proliferation Treaty (NPT) that India refused to sign it.

The refusal to sign the NPT showed India’s firm determination to sustain the pressure of the nuclear power-holding countries. India did not yield, rather, continued with her nuclear programmes. Economic growth coupled with military ‘preparedness’ face any eventuality, made India a regional power in South Asia and in the Indian Ocean realm, particularly,
towards the end of the twentieth century. China’s cautious approach and acquiescence during the Kargil war in 2001 might be attributed to India’s growing military prowess, backed by its economic potentials that the Chinese realized. This time they refrained from issuing any ultimatum to India as they had done in the earlier India-Pakistan wars.

With the cessation of the Cold War, the bi-polar world was replaced by multi-polar world, in spite of the ‘unchallenged’ US economic and military prowess. Number power nodes emerged in the periphery of the world-systems with capacity to challenge not only each other, but also, to powerful States. In the multi-polar world, the non-aligned approach has become redundant; rather, a powerful hegemonic approach appears to be geopolitically more appropriate.

Each pole and / or power node has to survive, and for survival, it has to struggle (social Darwinism). The powerful one survives, and the weaker one is either disintegrated, or absorbed by the powerful one. This is the way the international relations function, and result in the alignment of the political forces. It is an ever-changing geopolitical phenomenon in the world-systems. Since, most of the military and strategic alliances of the Cold War period have either disintegrated or disappeared, except the NATO, whose aerial extent has widened with the incorporation of some former socialist countries of central and Eastern Europe in the recent past. The period of strategic alliance has ended following the emergence of multi-polar world, and each pole is supposed to develop its own military power to resist the pressure and expansion of other country, or group of countries. It is, therefore, imperative for each nation, irrespective of their base of power potentials, to develop its military prowess, based on economic power potentials.

India is one of those poles and / or power nodes that have emerged in the recent past, and the future of the world appears to be destined by its ‘changed’ geopolitical code that aims at becoming ‘an entity uniquely dominant in the global system, with a position of pre-eminence, if. e. weltmacht.’ India is, therefore, one of those few States in the world that has the necessary military capacity, and economic potentialities, to decide the destiny of the global geopolitics. The traditional core States, including the USA, is getting older with the passage of time, but India and China are the new entrants in the present world-systems. Both are attempting to acquire a dominant position in the global power-politics, with the intention of becoming ‘weltmatcht.’
Conclusion

India’s non-aligned geopolitical code that it sought to spatialize in the field of international relations was destined by the following conditioning factors:

i. its contemporary location on the threshold of the two mutually exclusive power systems, being sustained by the US-maritime power and the Soviet-led continental power;

ii. its adherence to the ancient traditions of tolerance, synthesis, peace and assimilation;

iii. its comparative material weakness to sustain the pressure from the aforesaid military alliances;

iv. its perception that alignment with any of the alliances would make the territory of the country ‘a centre of intense geopolitical rivalry’, between the opposite forces, trying to bring as much area as possible of the Asiatic Rimland under their zone of influence;

v. its ardent belief that the people who had achieved freedom from the foreign rule, would disapprove any such idea that would again, put them under the ‘shadow’ influence of foreign hegemony and domination;

vi. its fear of being dominated by either of the alliances, if it entered into any kind of strategic deals with any of the alliances, in that case, its internal and external relations would have been subject to guidance by any one of them, with whom it had a defense pact.;

vii. Its assumption that alignment with any of the blocs / alliances, would result in the re-emergence of historical centrifugal forces, and it would have been difficult to hold together the country.

The preference to a non-aligned geopolitical code was a geopolitical necessity for a new State like India, which was undergoing a formative phase of its integration, consolidation and federation, at the time when ‘containment, deterrence, counter- deterrence, resistance, and armageddon scenario etc.,’ became the preferred words in international politics, particularly, in the bipolar Cold War politics. But, these words had no relevance in India’s non-aligned approach, because the approach was based on the five principles of peace, called the Panch shila. However, India’s non-aligned geopolitical code was not much successful at the regional level, but at the local level, it was a success, because relations with the Himalayan kingdoms were cordials. India offered to continue the British-founded system of informal protectorate over Nepal, Sikkim, and Bhutan, but with assurance of non-intervention in their
internal matters, and respect to their territorial integrity. Sikkim latter merged with the Indian Union. Similarly, India had offered an informal paternal attitude to Sri-Lanka (Ceylon). But, this was a period when the politics of Sri-Lanka (Ceylon) was not as disturbed to the extent as to have led to the outbreak of the civil war in the latter years.

However, at the regional level, there was acute rivalry with Pakistan in South Asia and with China at a larger Asian continental scale. Rivalries with Pakistan and China had resulted in a series wars. But, at the global level, the non-aligned geopolitical code was a neither a failure nor a success, rather, it lay at the crossroads or at the median of both failure and success. One thing, however, requires to be mentioned that on account of this approach, India could save herself from being a ‘centre of big-power geopolitical rivalry.’

A change in the geopolitical code started taking place, following the Indo-Soviet Strategic Treaty in September 1971 that necessarily helped India to overcome the problems arising out of ‘sustained but implicit’ threats from the USA, and China. India won the war against Pakistan, ignoring the Chinese threats, and the threat, posed by the US warship: Enterprise, that entered the Bay of Bengal to help the fighting Pakistani forces in East Pakistan, but the warship simply returned back.

A paradigm-shift in India’s geopolitical code was noticed following the successful detonation of a nuclear explosion, and that marked a departure from the Nehruvian legacy of Panch shila, to one of ‘sustained hegemony and domination,’ in South Asia. The change was necessitated because of changing attitudes and behaviours of the neighbours which started providing necessary sustenance to the different insurgent groups waging war against the Indian State. Bangladesh, Nepal, and Myanmar allowed their territories to be used by the insurgent groups of Nagaland, Assam, Manipur, Mizoram, and Tripura. China and Pakistan encouraged infiltrations into Indian territories. Sri-Lankan Tamils attempted to make part of Indian state, Tamilland, as their military base against Sri-Lanka. On being refused, they started creating problem to the integrity of the Union, and on being surrounded by these geopolitical problems, sustained by the neighbours, India was compelled to adopt a ‘restrained’ hostile geopolitical code. Of course, India’s growing economy was a great help for this change in the geopolitical code.

Since the beginning of the Khalistan movement in the state of Punjab in the early 80s of the last century, and the problem of terrorism in Jammu &
India’s Changing Geopolitical Code: an Attempt at Analysis

Kashmir since the late 80s of the last century, necessarily compelled India to adopt a harder line towards Pakistan, because Pakistan was directly involved in troubles in the Punjab and in Jammu & Kashmir state of the Union of India. In the east, the ambiguous role of the neighbours, sustaining, helping and provoking the insurgent groups which have waged war against India, further made her to adopt a harder line against them. A ‘restraint’ hostile geopolitical code, particularly, towards her neighbours became a geopolitical necessity for India to survive. Though Pakistan failed in the Punjab because the Khalistan movement weakened, and finally fizzled out, but it claimed thousands of lives. But, the Pakistan-sponsored movement in Jammu & Kashmir became more dangerous, because it turned into cross-border terrorism of wider spatial dimension. The detonation of nuclear explosions in 1998 was designed to terrorize Pakistan. Indian economy by the time reached a stage that it could sustain the pressure of war preparation, particularly, the preparation of nuclear weaponry system. India got access to what may be called the ‘satellite geopolitics’, because of successful test-firing of long distance missiles. Economic strength, coupled with military strength, towards the end of the last century, made India a regional power. The cessation of the Cold War in the late 80s and in the early 90s necessarily made the non-aligned approach redundant. Its geopolitical acceptability disappeared with the multi-polarization of the global political pattern. India, emerging fast as a regional power, became one of the poles of the ‘new’ world, with the capacity to motivate not only the regional politics, but also the global politics. Panch shila to India, thus, became meaningless, given the pressures it had to sustain.

India is now an acknowledged power, aspiring to become a ‘weltmachat.’ Its economy has shown a phenomenal increase, with a higher growth rate, comparable to the growth rate of China, another Asian country, trying hard to become a ‘weltmacht’. Both India and China are in stiff competition to become super-power in the coming years, or decades. As the world witnessed US-USSR rivalry during the Cold War period, the postmodern world would witness Sino-Indian rivalry. It has already been suggested to include India in the G8 in place of Russia as a member, not as an observer. India may be the second, or the third Asian country to become a ‘core’ power, in the world-economy.
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